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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Appellants in this case are a number of self- 
professed conservative, first-time investors who purchased 
securities from Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc. and the Henry 
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S. Miller Organization. They claim that Kidder and Miller 
fraudulently misrepresented the securities as low-risk 
vehicles similar to municipal bonds. Ultimately, the 
securities failed and the Appellants brought civil RICO 
claims. After extensive discovery, the District Court granted 
summary judgment to Kidder and Miller and held that the 
Appellants' claims were barred by the applicable four-year 
statute of limitations. On appeal, the Appellants contend 
that the court erred in three major respects: It incorrectly 
concluded that the Appellants were injured at the time they 
purchased the securities; it erred in holding that the 
Appellants were on inquiry notice of their injuries no later 
than early 1990; and, finally, it erred in refusing to 
equitably toll the statute of limitations. We will affirm. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
This case involves a securities class action brought 
against Kidder, a retail brokerage house, and Miller, "a 
multi-faceted real-estate management, appraisal, and 
investment organization." App. at 35. In the early 1980s, 
brokerage houses began working with real estate 
companies, such as Miller, to offer investment 
opportunities. They often sought to take advantage of the 
booming construction markets in the south and southwest 
regions of the United States known as the "Sunbelt." The 
companies formed limited partnerships, purchased Sunbelt 
commercial real estate, and sold interests to the general 
public. They marketed the investments as tax shelters, 
long-term capital gain opportunities, and income-producing 
plans. 
 
In 1981, Kidder and Miller created three separate 
investment funds. The two companies formed wholly owned 
subsidiaries to serve as general partners for the funds, and 
then sold limited partnerships to the public. The plan was 
to acquire commercial real estate properties in the Sunbelt, 
collect rental income (thus providing a steady, but modest, 
income stream for investors), and eventually sell the 
properties six to ten years later and collect substantial 
capital gains. The bulk of the return for investors was to 
come from appreciation in the properties. 
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Kidder prepared and distributed to its brokers a 
prospectus, sales information, a videotape, and other 
reference materials describing the first investment fund.1 In 
May 1992, Kidder began selling limited partnership units in 
that fund. By May 1986, it had sold units in all three funds 
to more than six thousand investors and raised 
approximately eighty-four million dollars. The funds 
purchased properties in Texas, Florida, Georgia, New 
Mexico, Arizona, Arkansas, and Illinois. 
 
The crux of the Appellants' claims is that Kidder 
fraudulently suggested that the funds were low-risk, 
conservative investments suitable for low net-worth 
individuals. The Appellants believe that Kidder specifically 
targeted unsophisticated investors, intentionally misled 
them about the nature of the funds, and charged excessive 
fees and commissions. These acts allegedly constituted 
violations of the federal securities laws,2 wire fraud, 18 
U.S.C. S 1343, mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. S 1341, and RICO 
violations. 
 
Furthermore, the Appellants claim that Kidder conducted 
inadequate due diligence in choosing commercial real estate 
investments. As a result, at least in part, fund properties 
lost many of their key tenants, and quarterly distributions 
(to limited partners) fell to only a few dollars per unit. 
Additional economic factors also weakened the Sunbelt real 
estate market as a whole,3 and the value of the funds' 
investments plunged. Nonetheless, the Appellants claim 
that Kidder intentionally "lulled [them] into a false sense of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. There are numerous corporate defendants in this case. See App. at 33. 
In order to avoid confusion, we will refer to all the Defendants/Appellees 
collectively as "Kidder." 
 
2. Specifically, the Appellants claim that Kidder violated S 17(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. S 77q, S 12(2) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. S 77I, and S 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b). 
 
3. Corporate divisions merged and moved their offices; a gas and oil 
decline hit Texas in the mid-80s; Congress passed the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act, which discouraged real estate investment; and aggressive 
construction eventually caused supply to meet and outstrip demand. See 
App. at 39. 
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security that `things would probably work out and 
substantial losses would be avoided.' " App. at 39. 
 
Economic conditions did not improve. By August 1991, 
Funds I and II had stopped paying quarterly distributions. 
In April 1992, Kidder informed investors that conditions 
were unlikely to rebound, and therefore it was initiating an 
"exit strategy." App. at 40. By 1994, all three funds had 
announced their intention to liquidate, which they 
accomplished between February and November of 1997. 
 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
John W. Mathews invested $20,000 in Fund II in 1984. 
He allegedly relied primarily upon oral representations by a 
Kidder broker. As the fund's value deteriorated, Mathews 
became understandably frustrated and disappointed. On 
January 23, 1995, he filed a class action complaint 
contending that Kidder had intentionally misrepresented 
the inherent risks associated with the funds and therefore 
had fraudulently induced him and others to invest. He 
claimed that Kidder had engaged in a pattern of 
racketeering activity prohibited by the federal RICO statute, 
18 U.S.C. SS 1961 et seq.. Specifically, he claimed that 
Kidder had committed the predicate acts of securities fraud, 
mail fraud, and wire fraud.4 
 
In response, Kidder filed a motion to dismiss. It claimed 
that: (1) Mathews lacked standing to assert claims involving 
Funds I and III because he had only invested in Fund II, (2) 
Mathews had failed to allege the necessary RICO elements, 
and (3) his claims were barred by RICO's four-year statute 
of limitations. The District Court denied the motion without 
prejudice. The court agreed that Mathews lacked standing 
concerning Funds I and III, but held that he could pursue 
his claims relating to Fund II. As to Kidder's remaining 
objections, the court allowed the case to move forward to 
develop a more complete record. 
 
Both parties quickly filed additional motions. Mathews 
sought to amend his complaint to include plaintiffs who 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. He also asserted a number of claims under state law, including breach 
of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation. 
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had invested in Funds I and III. Ultimately, he moved for 
class certification, including investors in all three funds. 
Kidder opposed Mathews' requests on procedural grounds, 
and in addition, argued that the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") barred Mathews' 
RICO action. The PSLRA, which Congress enacted on 
December 22, 1995, amended the federal RICO statute and 
explicitly eliminated securities fraud as a predicate act. See 
Pub. L. No. 104-67, S 107, 109 Stat. 737, 758 (1995), 
amending 18 U.S.C. S 1964(c) (1994). 
 
The District Court held that the PSLRA did not  bar 
Mathews' RICO claim. See Mathews v. Kidder Peabody & 
Co., Inc., 947 F.Supp. 180 (W.D. Pa. 1996). In addition, the 
court allowed Mathews to amend his complaint to include 
investors in Funds I and III, and it certified his requested 
class. Kidder filed an interlocutory appeal to this Court 
arguing that the PSLRA should apply retroactively to suits 
pending when the Act was passed. We rejected that claim. 
See Mathews v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 161 F.3d 156, 
170-71 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[W]e are extremely reluctant to 
create causes of action that did not previously exist, or -- 
as in this case -- to destroy causes of action and remedies 
that clearly did exist before Congress acted."). 
 
Discovery continued until November 1999. Kidder then 
moved for summary judgment, or alternatively to decertify 
the plaintiff class. Mathews opposed these motions, and 
once again, sought to amend the complaint. In particular, 
he wanted to add a new allegation claiming that the Kidder 
prospectus itself was fraudulent, because it misrepresented 
the inherent risks of the investment. The District Court 
denied Mathews' motion to amend. The court cited"undue 
prejudice to Defendants, undue delay on the part of the 
Movant, the Movant's repeated failure to cure deficiencies 
by previous amendments and futility of amendment." App. 
at 29. It held that amending the complaint would unduly 
prejudice the defendants because it "would necessitate the 
taking of significant additional discovery and the difficulties 
that would entail is persuasive." App. at 29. Mathews filed 
a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. 
 
On August 18, 2000, the District Court issued a 
thoughtful and thorough seventy-four page opinion and 
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order granting Kidder's motion for summary judgment. See 
App. at 33-106. The court held that Mathews' claims were 
barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations. 
Statute of limitations issues surrounding RICO claims 
historically have been tricky for two reasons. First, 
Congress failed to provide a statutory limitations period in 
the RICO statute itself, and second, the Supreme Court has 
consistently refused to determine when a RICO action 
accrues -- i.e., when the applicable limitations period 
begins to run. It is now well settled that RICO actions enjoy 
a four-year limitations period; the question of accrual, 
however, remains a source of controversy. 
 
In this case, the District Court applied what it termed an 
"injury discovery and pattern rule," see  App. at 57-61, 
under which the statute begins to run once "all of the 
elements of a civil RICO cause of action existed, whether or 
not discovered, and the plaintiffs knew [or should have 
known] of the existence and source of their injury." App. at 
60 (quoting Poling v. Hovanian Enters., 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 
511 (D.N.J. 2000)). The court assumed, for the sake of 
summary judgment, that Mathews' claims had merit and 
that Kidder had committed securities, wire, and mail fraud. 
Nonetheless, it had to address two questions: When did the 
elements of a RICO claim exist, and when did the 
Appellants know, or should they have known, of their 
injuries? 
 
First, the court held that "all the elements of Plaintiffs' 
RICO claim and their injury were in place no later than 
May 1986."5 App. at 77. Second, the court reviewed the mix 
of information available to the Appellants and concluded 
that they should have been aware of their injury"no later 
than February 1990." App. at 90. Thus, because both 
prongs of the "injury discovery and pattern rule" were 
satisfied, the statute of limitations began to run in early 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Assuming that Kidder committed the alleged offenses, the court 
concluded that the elements of securities fraud"were probably finalized 
by May 1986 . . . but certainly no later than December 1986," App. at 
68; mail fraud "occurred no later than May 1986," App. at 72, and 
interstate wire fraud "occurred in the early 1980s and certainly no later 
than March 1985." App. at 73. 
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1990. Mathews did not file his claim until almost five years 
later. Therefore, he was barred by RICO's four-year 
limitations period. The court also rejected Mathews' 
argument that the limitations period should be equitably 
tolled by Kidder's fraudulent acts and misrepresentations. 
Once again, the court assumed that Mathews' allegations 
were true, but nonetheless concluded that the Appellants 
had not exercised "reasonable diligence" and therefore 
could not benefit from equitable tolling.6  Mathews filed a 
timely appeal. 
 
III. Accrual Rule 
 
The statute of limitations for civil RICO claims has 
engendered a great deal of controversy. The statute itself 
does not contain a limitations period. See Rotella v. Wood, 
528 U.S. 549, 552, 120 S.Ct. 1075, 1079-80 (2000). As a 
result, in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 
483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759 (1987), the Supreme Court 
relied upon the Clayton Act and adopted an analogous four- 
year period. However, the Court did not specify when the 
period began, and three different interpretations arose. 
 
A number of Courts of Appeals adopted the "injury 
discovery accrual rule," which began the four-year period 
once "a plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury." 
Rotella, 528 U.S. at 553, 120 S.Ct. at 1080. This approach 
did not require any knowledge of the other RICO elements. 
All but one of the remaining Courts adopted the"injury and 
pattern discovery rule . . . under which a civil RICO claim 
accrues only when the claimant discovers, or should 
discover, both an injury and a pattern of RICO activity." Id. 
We alone adopted a third variant, the "last predicate act" 
rule. See Keystone Ins. Co., 863 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1988). 
From a plaintiff 's perspective, this was the most lenient 
approach: "Under this rule, the period began to run as soon 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. After dismissing Mathews' federal claims, the District Court declined 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law 
claims. See App. 104 ("In a case such as this, where all the federal 
claims brought under the RICO statue have been dismissed, there is 
little to gain in the way of convenience or judicial economy in having 
this 
court hear a case now consisting entirely of state claims."). 
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as the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury 
and the pattern of racketeering activity, but began to run 
anew upon each predicate act forming part of the same 
pattern." Rotella, 528 U.S. at 554, 120 S.Ct. at 1080. 
 
In 1997, the Supreme Court "cut the possibilities by 
one," rejecting our last predicate act rule. Id. (discussing 
Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 117 S.Ct. 1984 
(1997)). The Court based its holding on two arguments: (1) 
the rule created a limitations period "longer than Congress 
could have contemplated," which conflicted "with a basic 
objective -- repose -- that underlies limitations periods," 
and (2) it conflicted with the "ordinary Clayton Act rule" 
applicable in private antitrust actions. Klehr , 521 U.S. at 
187-88, 117 S.Ct. at 1989-90. In 2000, the Court again 
narrowed the possible approaches by rejecting the injury 
and pattern discovery rule. See Rotella, 528 U.S. at 555- 
559, 120 S.Ct. at 1080-83. The Court stressed the"basic 
policies of all limitations provisions: repose, elimination of 
stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff 's opportunity 
for recovery and a defendant's potential liability." Id. at 555, 
120 S.Ct. at 1081. In addition, the Court noted that the 
injury discovery rule would encourage plaintiffs to 
investigate their claims earlier and with greater vigor. See 
id. at 557, 120 S.Ct. at 1082. (noting that the object of civil 
RICO is "not merely to compensate victims but to turn 
them into prosecutors, `private attorneys general,' dedicated 
to eliminating racketeering activity"). 
 
In the wake of Rotella, at least two accrual rules remain 
possible: an injury discovery rule, where the limitations 
period begins to run once a plaintiff discovers her injury, or 
an injury occurrence rule, where discovery is irrelevant. See 
Rotella, 528 U.S. at 554 n.2, 120 S.Ct. at 1080 n.2 
(refusing to "settle upon a final rule"). In Forbes v. 
Eagleson, we recently considered these two approaches and 
adopted the injury discovery rule. 228 F.3d 471, 484 (3d 
Cir. 2000) ("[A] discovery rule applies whenever a federal 
statute of limitation is silent on the issue."); see also 
Rotella, 528 U.S. at 555, 120 S.Ct. at 1081 ("Federal courts, 
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to be sure, generally apply a discovery accrual rule when a 
statute is silent on the issue, as civil RICO is here.").7 
 
IV. Zenith Radio 
 
The Appellants contend that an exception to the standard 
RICO accrual rule applies in this case. They claim that the 
damages resulting from Kidder's misconduct were unclear 
at the time they invested, and "a cause of action does not 
accrue until the fact of financial loss becomes predictable, 
concrete and non-speculative and damages are provable." 
Appellants' Br. at 32. Thus, they argue that their claims did 
not accrue until Kidder indicated, in 1993 and 1994, that 
the investment funds were unlikely to be profitable. See 
Appellants' Br. at 31. 
 
The Appellants rely heavily upon Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338-42, 91 S.Ct. 
795, 806-08 (1971),8 a case involving alleged antitrust 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The District Court's decision, which preceded our ruling in Forbes by 
approximately two months, applied an "injury discovery and pattern 
rule." App. at 60. Under this formulation, a RICO claim does not accrue 
until a plaintiff discovers he has been injured and all of the elements of 
his RICO claim, including a pattern of racketeering activity, exist. The 
District Court's test, therefore, poses an important question -- whether 
a civil RICO claim must be complete before it accrues. The Supreme 
Court expressly declined to provide an answer in Rotella, 528 U.S. at 
558 n.4, 120 S.Ct. at 1082 n.4, and we too have been silent on the 
issue. See Forbes, 228 F.3d at 484 (addressing only the question of 
injury discovery because a pattern of racketeering activity was well 
established). We have little doubt that the question eventually will have 
to be addressed. However, its resolution is not necessary to the outcome 
of this case, because the Appellants have not contested, on appeal, the 
existence of a pattern of racketeering activity. Therefore, we leave the 
issue for another day. 
 
8. As Kidder recognizes in its brief, Zenith Radio concerned an antitrust 
violation. Under the Clayton Act, "a cause of action accrues and the 
statute begins to run when a defendant commits an act that injures a 
plaintiff 's business." Zenith Radio, 401 U.S. at 338, 91 S.Ct. at 806. 
Thus, antitrust claims are subject to the less plaintiff-friendly "injury 
occurrence" accrual rule. Because we hold that RICO claims are 
governed by a more lenient "injury discovery" rule, it is unclear whether 
we need to adopt the Zenith Radio exception (delaying the accrual of 
claims when damages are merely speculative) in the RICO context. For 
the sake of discussion, however, we will assume without deciding that 
the Zenith Radio exception could apply to RICO claims. 
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violations. In Zenith Radio, the defendant raised a statute of 
limitations defense, and argued that many of the purported 
injuries arose from conduct that occurred more than four 
years before the plaintiff filed suit. The Supreme Court 
rejected the defendant's argument. The Court held that at 
the time of the original misconduct, future damages were 
speculative and unclear and therefore unrecoverable. See 
id. at 339, 91 S.Ct. at 806. The Court noted that it would 
be "contrary to congressional purpose[s]" to foreclose 
recovery of those damages. It held that: 
 
       [R]efusal to award future profits as too speculative is 
       equivalent to holding that no cause of action has yet 
       accrued for any but those damages already suffered. In 
       these instances, the cause of action for future 
       damages, if they ever occur, will accrue only on the 
       date they are suffered; thereafter the plaintiff may sue 
       to recover them at any time within four years from the 
       date they were inflicted. 
 
401 U.S. at 339, 91 S.Ct. at 806. The Appellants argue that 
this case is factually similar to Zenith Radio , and that RICO 
damages were merely speculative at the time of their 
investment. For support, they cite a list of cases from the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals and our recent decision in 
Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2000).9 
 
The District Court rejected the proposition that the 
Appellants were injured when "their investments resulted in 
a `catastrophic loss,' that is, loss of capital gains from 
appreciation of the properties when they were sold." App. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In Maio, we held that a plaintiff lacks standing to bring a RICO claim 
unless he has suffered a concrete financial loss. See Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 
221 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs sued their HMO claiming that 
they had received an "inferior health care" product. They alleged neither 
a denial of medical benefits nor inferior treatment. Instead, their claim 
rested solely upon Aetna's misrepresentation, which allegedly caused 
them to pay too much in premiums. We rejected the plaintiffs' theory. 
Although we recognized that the diminution in value of tangible property, 
"like a plot of land or diamond necklace," can constitute a RICO injury, 
the plaintiffs' interest was merely a contractual right. 221 F.3d at 488- 
89. In that context, a RICO injury requires "proof that Aetna failed to 
perform under the parties' contractual arrangement." Id. at 490. 
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42. Instead, the court ruled that the underlying claim was 
for securities fraud, and in such cases, an injury occurs 
when an investor purchases overpriced securities. See App. 
at 66, 75 ("[I]t is well established that securities fraud in 
the sale of limited partnership interests occurs when the 
partnership interests are sold.") (citing Volk v. D.A. 
Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987)). The 
court, however, did not explicitly address Zenith Radio.10 
Nonetheless, we agree with the District Court's conclusion 
and find the Appellants' reliance upon Zenith Radio 
misplaced. 
 
The value of a security is related to its expected return 
and its inherent risk. All else being equal, the greater the 
expected return and the lower the risk, the more valuable 
the security. If we accept the Appellants' allegations as 
true, Kidder overstated the expected return of the funds 
and downplayed their inherent risks. Thus, Kidder's 
misrepresentations exaggerated the value of the funds and 
led the Appellants to purchase overpriced securities. We 
therefore conclude that the Appellants sustained an injury 
when they purchased units in Kidder's investment funds -- 
the only question is whether their damages, at the time of 
their investment, were sufficiently concrete. 
 
We answer in the affirmative for three reasons. First, we 
agree with Kidder that the actual value of the securities was 
readily calculable at the time of the Appellants' investment. 
See Appellant's Br. at 27 ("While this determination may 
require some calculation or even expert testimony, the 
measure of damages is not speculative."). The raison d'etre 
of many investment banks and financial institutions is to 
calculate the value of complicated securities, many of which 
are far more complex than the funds at issue here. 
Certainly, district courts are no strangers to expert 
testimony concerning financial valuation. See, e.g., Sowell 
v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1991) 
("[D]amages are most commonly calculated as the difference 
between the price paid for a security and the security's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The court cited Zenith Radio only once, noting that courts apply a 
pure injury occurrence accrual rule for Clayton Act antitrust violations. 
See App. at 49 n.12. 
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`true value.' "). In this case, as Kidder contends, "the Funds 
could have been valued at any time based, in part, on the 
yearly valuations of these properties." Appellant's Br. at 27. 
The Appellants' damages, at the time they invested, were 
simply the difference between the approximate value of the 
Funds, calculated based upon market information free of 
Kidder's misrepresentations, and the actual purchase price. 
 
Second, we agree with the reasoning employed by the 
only other Circuit Court of Appeals to have addressed this 
issue. In a remarkably similar factual setting, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that investors were injured 
when they purchased overpriced limited partnership units 
based upon the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations. 
See In re Merrill Lynch Ltd. P'ships Litig., 154 F.3d 56, 59 
(2d Cir. 1998). Before the Merrill Lynch decision, a number 
of Second Circuit cases had suggested that a RICO injury 
did not occur at the time of investment. 11 The District Court 
in Merrill Lynch summarized those cases as follows: 
 
       [They stand] for the proposition that when a creditor 
       has been defrauded, but contractual or other legal 
       remedies remain which hold out a `real possibility' that 
       the debt, and therefore the injury, may be eliminated, 
       RICO injury is speculative, and a RICO claim is not 
       ripe until those remedies are exhausted. 
 
In re Merrill Lynch Ltd. P'ships Litig., 7 F.Supp.2d 256, 263 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). Nonetheless, the court drew a critical 
distinction between cases involving contractual debt 
instruments and those involving "equity investments with 
no basis for recovery other than the limited partnerships' 
performance." Id. Traditionally, the line between debt and 
equity has been well defined.12 Debt contracts promise set 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. See First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 767- 
68 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a RICO injury does not occur until a debt 
becomes uncollectible and the note holder exhausts his contractual 
remedies); Cruden v. Bank of New York, 957 F.2d 961, 977-78 (2d Cir. 
1992) (holding that a RICO injury does not occur until a debtor defaults 
on promised principal and equity payments); Bankers Trust Co. v. 
Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a RICO 
injury does not occur until it becomes clear that a loan will not be 
repaid). 
12. We recognize that modern financial markets, and the widespread use 
of complicated derivative instruments, have blurred the once-sharp 
 
                                13 
  
future payments of interest and principal. Upon default, an 
investor can recover damages through a contract action. In 
contrast, an equity investment is traditionally considered 
an ownership stake in an underlying asset. There is no 
promised return; therefore, an investor has no contractual 
remedy if the underlying property, asset, or venture fails. 
 
The District Court in Merrill Lynch recognized that in the 
debt context, a RICO injury occurs only when a debtor 
defaults on his contractual obligation. 7 F.Supp.2d at 263. 
Only at that point can an investor be sure that he will not 
receive the benefit of his bargain. We implicitly recognized 
the same principle in Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472 (3d 
Cir. 2000). In that case, the plaintiffs claimed that Aetna's 
fraudulent misrepresentations had led them to buy 
overpriced health insurance. We held, however, that a RICO 
injury did not occur until Aetna failed to perform its 
contractual obligations -- i.e., until it failed to provide 
health benefits or treatment that it had promised. 221 F.3d 
at 488-90. In essence, we characterized the plaintiffs' 
property interest as a contractual right to receive certain 
benefits, and distinguished it from an ownership interest in 
tangible property. See id. at 489-90 ("[T]he property rights 
at issue are different from interests in real or personal 
property."). 
 
In contrast, the Appellants' interest in this case was an 
ownership stake in real property, fundamentally no 
different than "a plot of land or a diamond necklace." Maio, 
221 F.3d at 488. Although Kidder may have been overly 
optimistic in describing its investment funds, it never 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
distinction between debt and equity. See Anthony P. Polito, Useful 
Fictions: Debt and Equity Classification in Corporate Tax Law, 30 Ariz. 
St. 
L.J. 761, 790 (1998) ("[F]inance theory cannot identify the true boundary 
between debt and equity."). Today, debt contracts are openly traded, are 
valued from moment to moment, and often behave like equity, especially 
when a company experiences financial difficulty. Thus, any legal test 
dependent upon a bright-line distinction between contractual debt and 
equity ownership is at best precarious. However, both the Second 
Circuit, and possibly the Supreme Court, have apparently adopted this 
distinction. Luckily, because this case concerns a clear equity interest 
in 
real property, we need not explore this potential minefield any further. 
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promised a set return. Therefore, the Appellants have no 
contractual remedy for the losses they incurred. Instead, 
Kidder offered an equity investment, contingent upon the 
appreciation, or lack thereof, of the underlying Sunbelt 
properties. The crux of the Appellants' claim is that they 
overpaid for that interest. We believe that the most accurate 
way to measure that loss, like for any other tangible 
property interest, would be to calculate the difference 
between what the Appellants paid and the true market 
value of what they received. Therefore, we agree with the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals that this case is 
distinguishable from those involving contractual 
agreements, such as debt contracts. When a defendant 
fraudulently misleads individuals into purchasing equity 
interests in real property, an injury occurs at the time of 
investment. 
 
Finally, caselaw concerning U.S. securities regulations 
also supports our conclusion. The Appellants argue that 
their losses did not become sufficiently concrete until 
Kidder decided to liquidate the funds in 1993. They 
presumably believe that the only non-speculative way to 
determine damages would be to calculate the difference 
between what they originally paid for the fund units and 
what they received upon liquidation. In other words, they 
believe rescission is the only proper approach. See Pinter v. 
Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 641 n.18, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 2076 n.18 
(1988) ("[R]escission [provides] for restoration of the status 
quo by requiring the buyer to return what he received from 
the seller;" in terms of damages, rescission provides "the 
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, 
less the amount of any income received thereon."). Of 
course, we need not determine the best method for 
calculating damages in the present case. Our task is merely 
to decide whether the Appellants' damages could have been 
calculated at the time of their injury. If an "out of pocket 
measure" of damages (the difference between the purchase 
price of a security and its true value) is viable in this case, 
we must conclude that the Appellants' injury, at the time of 
their investment, was sufficiently concrete. 
 
The Appellants have alleged securities fraud under 
S 12(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933. See 15 
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U.S.C. S 77I, App. at 38. Section 12(2) specifically provides 
for rescissionary damages. See Bally v. Legg Mason Wood 
Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991). However, 
the Appellants also cite S 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b), App. at 38. Damages in 
S 10(b) securities fraud cases "are most commonly 
calculated as the difference between the price paid for a 
security and the security's `true value.' " Sowell v. Butcher 
& Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1991). Although 
we have declined to establish a firm rule for calculating 
S 10(b) damages, see Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 
618, 624 n.2 (3d Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has commented at length about the conceptual 
shortcomings of rescission: 
 
       [T]he rescissional measure permits the defrauded 
       securities buyer to place upon the defendant the 
       burden of any decline in the value of the securities 
       between the date of purchase and the date of sale even 
       though only a portion of that decline may have been 
       proximately caused by the defendant's wrong. . . . 
       Under these circumstances, the rescissional measure is 
       unjust insofar as it compensates an investor for the 
       nonspecific risks which he assumes by entering the 
       market. Losses thus accruing have no relation to either 
       the benefits derived by the defendants from the fraud 
       or to the blameworthiness of their conduct. 
 
Huddleston v. Herman & MacClean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th 
Cir. 1981), modified on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375, 103 
S.Ct. 683 (1983). We have expressed similar sentiments. 
See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 
186, 203 n.25 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Although the Supreme Court 
has reserved the question whether a rescissionary measure 
of damages is ever appropriate for defrauded buyers under 
rule 10b-5, this court has expressed clear disapproval of a 
damage theory that would insure defrauded buyers against 
downside market risk unrelated to the fraud."). 
 
Thus, in most S 10(b) cases, we are extremely hesitant to 
award rescissionary damages and instead apply an"out of 
pocket measure." In this case, there is nothing in the 
record to suggest that the Appellants' injuries were any 
more speculative or difficult to calculate than those in a 
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typical S 10(b) claim. Therefore, we reject the Appellants' 
argument that their claims require a rescissionary measure 
of damages. Instead, we conclude that the Appellants' 
damages, at the time they purchased units in Kidder's 
investment funds, could have been calculated by an"out of 
pocket measure" and thus were sufficiently concrete and 
non-speculative. 
 
V. Injury Discovery 
 
The Appellants' second primary objection is that the 
District Court erred by holding that they should have 
discovered their injury "no later than February 1990." App. 
at 90. Because the court granted summary judgment, the 
burden of proof is initially on Kidder to demonstrate the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact surrounding the 
Appellants' discovery of their injury. See Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53 
(1986). We recognize that this puts Kidder in the 
unenviable position of arguing that its fraud was so obvious 
that the Appellants should have discovered their injuries. In 
addition, the issue is extremely fact-specific. See Davis v. 
Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 623 n.10 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he 
applicability of the statute of limitations usually implicates 
factual questions as to when plaintiff discovered or should 
have discovered the elements of the cause of action; 
accordingly, `defendants bear a heavy burden in seeking to 
establish as a matter of law that the challenged claims are 
barred.' ") (quoting Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, 
Ltd., 760 F.2d 481, 498 (3d Cir. 1985)). Therefore, Kidder's 
task is not an easy one.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. It is not, however, impossible. We quickly reject any suggestion by 
the Appellants that summary judgment can never be granted when the 
issue of injury discovery is contested by the parties. Instead, we agree 
that "[i]f the facts needed in order to determine when `a reasonable 
investor of ordinary intelligence' discovered or should have discovered 
the fraud can be gleaned from the pleadings, a court may resolve the 
issue of the existence of fraud at the summary judgment stage." App. at 
78. Thus, at least in the RICO context, we disagree with the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which has held that "as a general rule, the 
issue of when a plaintiff in the exercise of due diligence should have 
known of the basis for his claims is not an appropriate question for 
summary judgment." Morton's Market, Inc. v. Gustafson's Dairy, Inc., 198 
F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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In Forbes, we adopted an "injury discovery rule" whereby 
a RICO claim accrues when "plaintiffs knew or should have 
known of their injury." 228 F.3d at 484. By our own plain 
language, the rule is both subjective and objective. The 
subjective component needs little explanation -- a claim 
accrues no later than when the plaintiffs themselves 
discover their injuries. However, we offered little insight into 
the objective prong of the Forbes test. We take this 
opportunity to do so. 
 
In order to determine whether the Appellants were on 
"inquiry notice" of their injuries, the District Court relied 
heavily upon caselaw in other Circuits concerning 
securities fraud. Without a doubt, the Appellants' claim is 
greatly dependent upon their allegations of securities fraud. 
However, it is important to note that "[t]he focus of accrual 
in a RICO action is different from that for a fraud claim 
where the focus is on the acts of the defendants." Landy v. 
Mitchell Petroleum Tech. Corp., 734 F.Supp. 608, 625 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). More specifically, a RICO claim accrues 
when the plaintiffs should have discovered their injuries. In 
contrast, a securities fraud claim accrues when the 
plaintiffs should have discovered the misrepresentations 
and wrong-doing of the defendants. The difference is subtle, 
but in some circumstances, it can be dispositive. 14 In this 
case, however, it is insignificant because the fraud and 
injury occurred at approximately the same time -- when 
the Appellants purchased Kidder's securities. Furthermore, 
in most securities fraud actions, the plaintiffs' injuries are 
inextricably intertwined with the defendant's 
misrepresentations. Discovery of one leads almost 
immediately to discovery of the other. Therefore, we believe 
that the District Court did not err by relying upon 
securities fraud precedent to determine whether the 
Appellants were on "inquiry notice" of their injuries. 
 
It would be an understatement to characterize the body 
of caselaw concerning what constitutes "inquiry notice" in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. In Landy, 734 F.Supp. at 625, the District Court held that the 
defendant's fraud occurred approximately three years before the 
plaintiffs were injured. Thus, the plaintiffs' securities fraud claim 
accrued three years before their RICO action accrued. 
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a federal securities fraud action as extensive. See, e.g., 
Lawrence Kaplan, Annotation, What Constitutes"Inquiry 
Notice" Sufficient to Commence Running of Statute of 
Limitations in Securities Fraud Action -- Post-Lampf Cases, 
148 A.L.R. Fed. 629 (1998). The general articulation of the 
inquiry notice standard, however, is fairly consistent.15 In 
the context of a RICO action predicated upon a securities 
fraud claim, we hold that a plaintiff is on inquiry notice 
whenever circumstances exist that would lead a reasonable 
investor of ordinary intelligence, through the exercise of 
reasonable due diligence, to discover his or her injury. 
 
Some courts have further refined the inquiry notice test 
into a multi-step analysis. See, e.g., Havenick v. Network 
Express, 981 F.Supp. 480 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Addeo v. 
Braver, 956 F.Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The District 
Court in this case applied a two-part test: "(1) whether the 
plaintiffs knew or should have known of the possibility of 
fraud (`storm warnings') and, once that possibility arose, (2) 
whether plaintiffs exercised due diligence to determine the 
origin and extent of the fraud. The first part of the test is 
objective, the second subjective." App. at 80 (citations 
omitted). In other words, the court asked whether there 
were sufficient storm warnings on the horizon, and if so, 
whether the Appellants exercised due diligence to recognize 
them. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. See Great Rivers Coop. of Southeastern Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 
120 F.3d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[I]nquiry notice exists when there are 
`storm warnings' that would alert a reasonable person of the possibility 
of misleading information, relayed either by an act or by omission."); 
Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 82 F.3d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[I]f a 
prudent person would have become suspicious from the knowledge 
obtained through the initial prudent inquiry and would have investigated 
further, a plaintiff will be deemed to have knowledge of facts which 
would have been disclosed in a more extensive investigation."); Dodds v. 
Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993) (Plaintiff is on inquiry 
notice "when a reasonable investor of ordinary intelligence would have 
discovered the existence of the fraud."); Caviness v. Derand Res. Corp., 
983 F.2d 1295, 1303 (4th Cir. 1993) (Inquiry notice exists when plaintiff 
"has such knowledge as would put a reasonably prudent purchaser on 
notice to inquire, so long as that inquiry would reveal the facts on which 
a claim is ultimately based."). 
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We hold that inquiry notice should be analyzed in two 
steps. First, the burden is on the defendant to show the 
existence of "storm warnings." As the District Court noted, 
storm warnings may take numerous forms, and we will not 
attempt to provide an exhaustive list. They may include, 
however, "substantial conflicts between oral representations 
of the brokers and the text of the prospectus, . . . the 
accumulation of information over a period of time that 
conflicts with representations that were made when the 
securities were originally purchased," or "any financial, 
legal or other data that would alert a reasonable person to 
the probability that misleading statements or significant 
omissions had been made." App. at 80-81. 
 
The existence of storm warnings is a totally objective 
inquiry. Plaintiffs need not be aware of the suspicious 
circumstances or understand their import. It is enough that 
a reasonable investor of ordinary intelligence would have 
discovered the information and recognized it as a storm 
warning. Thus, investors are presumed to have read 
prospectuses, quarterly reports, and other information 
relating to their investments. This comports with the 
general purpose of civil RICO to encourage plaintiffs to 
actively investigate potential criminal activity, to become 
"prosecutors, `private attorneys general,' dedicated to 
eliminating racketeering activity." Rotella , 528 U.S. at 557, 
120 S.Ct. at 1082. 
 
Second, if the defendants establish the existence of storm 
warnings, the burden shifts to the plaintiffs to show that 
they exercised reasonable due diligence and yet were 
unable to discover their injuries. This inquiry is both 
subjective and objective. The plaintiffs must first show that 
they investigated the suspicious circumstances. 16 Then, we 
must determine whether their efforts were adequate-- i.e., 
whether they exercised the due diligence expected of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. We are reluctant to excuse Appellants' lack of inquiry because, in 
retrospect, reasonable diligence would not have uncovered their injury. 
Such a holding would, in effect, discourage investigation of potential 
racketeering activity. See Rotella, 528 U.S. at 557, 120 S.Ct. at 1082. 
Therefore, if storm warnings existed, and the Appellants chose not to 
investigate, we will deem them on inquiry notice of their claims. 
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reasonable investors of ordinary intelligence. Because the 
stated goal of civil RICO is to encourage active investigation 
of potential racketeering activity, see Rotella , 528 U.S. at 
557, 120 S.Ct. at 1082, we reject the proposition that 
unsophisticated investors should be held to a lower 
standard of due diligence. 
 
In this case, the District Court found that Kidder had 
established the existence of storm warnings. In particular, 
our review of the record, in addition to the District Court's 
findings, indicates four areas of potential concern-- the 
initial prospectus, the "paltry" annual distributions of 
rental income, the falling net asset value of each 
partnership unit, and Kidder's periodic assessment of the 
funds' economic health. While it is true that the"mix of 
information" may constitute a storm warning in the 
aggregate, we will address the prospectus and the 
subsequent financial updates separately. 
 
We begin with the prospectus. The District Court focused 
much of its attention upon the descriptions of risks 
provided in the prospectus. See App. at 49-53; 2443-2525. 
We do not dispute that the language cited by the court is 
present, or that "the specific risks discussed in the 
[prospectus] are most of the events on which Plaintiffs base 
their allegations of fraud." App. at 82. Nonetheless, we 
agree with the spirit of the Appellants' position, that there 
is nothing in the document to suggest the magnitude of the 
many enumerated risks. In fact, in reading through the 
numerous cautionary provisions, we are reminded of the 
laundry lists of possible side-effects that accompany most 
prescription medications. Just because there are risks, 
even if they are numerous, does not mean that a drug is 
unsafe. Similarly, there is nothing in the prospectus to 
suggest that the funds are especially risky or inappropriate 
for conservative investors.17 
 
Like the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, we are mindful 
of the dangers in adopting too broad an interpretation of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. We agree with the District Court, however, that a reasonable investor 
of ordinary intelligence would have read the prospectus. Therefore, we 
reject any argument based upon the Appellants' ignorance of its 
contents. 
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inquiry notice. See Law v. Medco Research, Inc. , 113 F.3d 
781, 786 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[T]oo much emphasis on the 
statute of limitations can precipitate premature and 
groundless suits, as plaintiffs rush to beat the deadline 
without being able to obtain good evidence of fraud"); 
Fujisawa Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor, 115 F.3d 1332, 1335 
(7th Cir. 1997) ("Inquiry notice . . . must not be construed 
so broadly that the statute of limitations starts running too 
soon for the victim of the fraud to be able to bring suit."). 
If a relatively generic enumeration of possible risks, without 
any meaningful discussion of their magnitude, can be 
enough to establish inquiry notice at the summary 
judgment stage, we would encourage a flood of untimely 
litigation. Therefore, we hold that the prospectus, by itself, 
does not constitute a storm warning. 
 
Kidder's numerous financial updates, however, are a 
different matter.18 Based upon the correspondence 
concerning Funds I and II, we conclude that the District 
Court, if anything, was overly generous to the Appellants in 
holding that they should have discovered their injuries by 
early 1990. Sufficient storm warnings existed for investors 
in Funds I and II no later than April of 1989. On August 
18, 1988, Kidder informed investors in Fund I that their 
quarterly distribution had fallen to $3.00 per unit. 19 This 
represented over a 66% decrease in the initial fund 
distributions, which ranged from $9.07 (Q3, 1983) to $9.40 
(Q1, 1985). On that same date, Kidder informed investors 
in Fund II that their quarterly distributions had fallen to 
$1.50 per unit. This represented over a 75% decrease in the 
initial fund distributions, which ranged from $6.00 (Q2, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Because reasonable investors of ordinary intelligence read 
correspondence describing the economic health of their investments, we 
presume that the Appellants read the documents that Kidder sent them. 
 
19. There are implications in both the parties' briefs and the District 
Court's opinion that the total amount of distributions was "paltry" or 
excessively low. We find this argument puzzling. A $9.00 quarterly 
distribution, if consistent, would result in an approximate annual yield 
of 7.2% ($36.00 per $500 unit). This rate of return is generally 
consistent with a conservative, low risk investment vehicle. Contrary to 
the suggestions of the parties, a higher return would arouse suspicion 
that the securities were actually high-risk, speculative investments. 
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1985) to $7.00 (Q4, 1986). Even if the distributions had 
returned to their original levels at some later time, this sort 
of volatility is simply inconsistent with a conservative 
investment vehicle similar to municipal bonds. 
 
Furthermore, Kidder also sent the Appellants annual 
updates on the total net asset value of the individual units.20 
As of December 31, 1985, Fund I units had a total net 
asset value of $532. On April 8, 1989, Kidder sent a letter 
to Fund I investors indicating that total net asset value had 
fallen to $337. See App. at 1204. This represented a 36% 
decrease from 1985. As of December 31, 1985, Fund II 
units had a total net asset value of $509. On April 8, 1989, 
Kidder sent a letter to Fund II investors indicating that total 
net asset value had fallen to $351. See App. at 1872. This 
represented a 31% decrease from 1985. 
 
The Appellants' only response is that "there was ample 
evidence from which a jury could conclude that it was 
entirely reasonable for [them] to wait and see how things 
developed." Appellants' Br. at 40. The Appellants 
fundamentally misunderstand their own argument. They 
contend that Kidder fraudulently misrepresented the 
inherent risk of the investment funds. According to modern 
finance, risk is best understood as a security's volatility. 
Therefore, regardless of whether the funds recovered, the 
large swings in their distributions and net asset values are 
inconsistent with low-risk, conservative investments.21 After 
the funds' net asset values fell over 30% and their 
distributions fell by over 60%, the Appellants should have 
recognized that they were not the safe, conservative vehicles 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. We agree with the District Court that these values were, at the very 
least, "a good indicator . . . of [the fund units'] market value." App. at 
86. 
 
21. Even if the Appellants' argument was on-point, courts have 
consistently discouraged a "wait and see" strategy. For example, in 
Tregenza v. Great Am. Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 
1993), "plaintiffs waited patiently to sue. If the stock rebounded from 
the 
cellar they would have investment profits, and if it stayed in the cellar 
they would have legal damages. Heads I win, tails you lose." The court 
held that the plaintiffs were on inquiry notice. See also Sterlin v. 
Biomune 
Sys., 154 F.3d 1191, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The purpose behind 
commencing the . . . limitations period upon inquiry notice is to 
discourage investors from adopting a wait-and-see approach."). 
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promised by Kidder. Based upon the financial information 
received by the Appellants, we have no problem concluding 
that ominous storm warnings, concerning Funds I and II, 
were present no later than April 1989. 
 
As the Appellants point out, however, Fund III is a closer 
question. By April of 1990, the Fund's net asset value had 
fallen only 14%, see App. at 2629, and its distributions 
were still consistent. See App. at 2947-48. In fact, a 
noticeable decrease in the Fund's distributions did not 
occur until the first quarter of 1992, and the Appellants 
were not informed until May 15, 1992. See App. at 981. 
Even when viewed in combination with Kidder's prospectus 
and the cautionary language in its quarterly updates, we 
would be hard-pressed to find no genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether Fund III investors were on inquiry notice 
of their injuries prior to 1992. However, the Appellants did 
not allege a separate cause of action based solely upon 
Fund III. Instead, they sought and were granted 
certification of a class that included investors in all three 
funds, and they alleged a common, overarching pattern of 
racketeering activity. See Mathews v. Kidder Peabody & 
Co., No 95-85, 1996 WL 665729, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 
1996) ("Plaintiffs have alleged a large, unitary scheme, a 
common course of conduct."). As we previously concluded, 
the storm warnings pertaining to Funds I and II were 
overwhelming. Thus, we conclude that sufficient storm 
warnings existed for the entire class certified by the 
Appellants. 
 
Because storm warnings were present, we must next 
determine whether the Appellants exercised due diligence 
expected of reasonable investors of ordinary intelligence. We 
conclude that they did not. Based upon the record, the 
parties' briefs, and the District Court's opinion, the only 
action that might be termed due diligence is a single letter 
from Attorney Robert Wolf inquiring into the status of Fund 
I.22  See App. at 68-69. According to the District Court, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. According to the District Court's opinion, a small number of 
plaintiffs 
testified as to having asked their brokers about the status of their 
investment, but they quickly "dropped the matter" after being assured 
that everything was all right. See App. at 69-70 & n.62. A few cursory 
inquiries cannot amount to reasonable due diligence. 
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Kidder responded with a four and one-half page letter, 
reiterating financial information provided in quarterly 
reports. The only positive sentiment in the letter was 
Kidder's statement that the General Partners "remain 
confident in the underlying value of the Partnership's real 
estate assets and believe this value will be realized once 
these markets turnaround." App. at 101 n.61. There is no 
evidence that Wolf followed-up in any fashion. We agree 
with the District Court that if anything, this evidences a 
lack of due diligence. 
 
Furthermore, to determine what constitutes "reasonable" 
due diligence, we must consider the magnitude of the 
existing storm warnings. The more ominous the warnings, 
the more extensive the expected inquiry. In this case, the 
warnings, at least for investors in Fund I and II, were 
massive and extremely threatening. For "conservative first- 
time investors," they must have appeared like funnel 
clouds. That none of them pressed Kidder for an 
explanation defies comprehension. 
 
This case stands in stark contrast to Forbes, 228 F.3d at 
479, where the plaintiffs hired an investigator, who made 
numerous inquiries and requested financial documents not 
only from the defendant, but also from other related 
parties. He continued to pursue his investigation in spite of 
continued opposition. Reasonable due diligence does not 
require a plaintiff to exhaust all possible avenues of 
inquiry. Nor does it require the plaintiff to actually discover 
his injury. At the very least, however, due diligence does 
require plaintiffs to do something more than send a single 
letter to the defendant. If we were to hold that the 
Appellants exercised reasonable due diligence in this case, 
it would strip the requirement of any meaningful 
significance. Therefore, because by early 1990, there were 
numerous storm warnings that the Appellants failed to 
adequately investigate, their claims accrued, and the 
limitations period began to run, on that date.23 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. Because we agree that the Appellants should have discovered their 
injuries no later than early 1990, we need not consider whether the 
District Court erred in denying leave to amend their complaint. Even if 
the Appellants were allowed to include allegations that the prospectus 
itself was fraudulent, it would not change the outcome of the case. See 
App. at 44 n.7. Because the Appellants should have discovered Kidder's 
misrepresentations, whether within or outside the prospectus, more than 
four years before they filed suit, their claims are barred. 
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VI. Fraudulent Concealment / Equitable Tolling 
 
Finally, the Appellants argue that even if their claims 
accrued in 1990, the statute of limitations should be tolled 
due to Kidder's fraudulent concealment of its racketeering 
activity. "Fraudulent concealment is an `equitable doctrine 
[that] is read into every federal statute of limitations.' " 
Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 624 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
In Rotella, the Supreme Court indicated that RICO's 
limitation period could be tolled "where a pattern remains 
obscure in the face of a plaintiff 's diligence in seeking to 
identify it." 120 S.Ct. at 1084, 528 S.Ct. at 561. We 
adopted this holding in Forbes, 228 F.3d at 486-88, and 
held that the plaintiff has the burden of proving the three 
necessary elements of a fraudulent concealment claim-- (1) 
"active misleading" by the defendant, (2) which prevents the 
plaintiff from recognizing the validity of her claim within the 
limitations period, (3) where the plaintiff 's ignorance is not 
attributable to her lack of "reasonable due diligence in 
attempting to uncover the relevant facts." See also Klehr v. 
A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 195-96, 117 S.Ct. 1984, 
1993 (1997) ("[W]e conclude that `fraudulent concealment' 
in the context of civil RICO embodies a `due diligence' 
requirement."). However, when a plaintiff merely seeks to 
survive summary judgment, there need only be a genuine 
issue of material fact that the doctrine applies. Thus, a 
court must determine: 
 
       (1) whether there is sufficient evidence to support a 
       finding that defendants engaged in affirmative acts of 
       concealment designed to mislead the plaintiffs 
       regarding facts supporting their Count I claim, (2) 
       whether there is sufficient evidence to support a 
       finding that plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence, 
       and (3) whether there is sufficient evidence to support 
       a finding that plaintiffs were not aware, nor should 
       they have been aware, of the facts supporting their 
       claim until a time within the limitations period 
       measured backwards from when the plaintiffs filed 
       their complaint. Absent evidence to support these 
       findings there is no genuine dispute of material fact on 
       the issue and the defendants are entitled to summary 
       judgment. 
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Forbes, 228 F.3d at 487 (citing Northview Motors, Inc. v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 87-88 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
Here, we will assume that Kidder actively misled the  
Appellants.24 Therefore, we must determine whether they 
exercised "reasonable diligence" in attempting to uncover 
the facts necessary to support a claim.25  
 
Although a fraudulent concealment defense can offer a 
tremendous advantage to plaintiffs,26 it is of little practical 
utility here. In order to avoid summary judgment, there 
must be a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
Appellants exercised reasonable due diligence in 
investigating their claim. We have already answered that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. The Appellants rely primarily upon "optimistic statements" that 
Kidder included in its quarterly newsletters. See Appellants' Br. at 46. 
We have carefully reviewed these statements and are skeptical that they 
amount to active misleading. Nonetheless, because we must draw all 
reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiffs at the summary 
judgment stage, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 
106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513 (1986), we will assume that they have satisfied the 
first prong of the fraudulent concealment test. 
 
25. The Appellants claim that they "need not demonstrate due diligence 
to survive summary judgment." Appellants' Br. at 47. This position is 
squarely foreclosed by Forbes, 228 F.3d at 487. 
 
26. Upon first inspection, the utility of a fraudulent concealment defense 
may not be readily apparent. In a civil RICO case where all the requisite 
elements are present, a claim accrues immediately upon the plaintiff 's 
discovery of her injury. See Forbes, 228 F.3d at 484. Absent equitable 
tolling doctrines, ignorance of the remaining elements of her claim, 
including the pattern required by RICO, is immaterial. A plaintiff has 
four years from the time she discovers her injury to investigate, gather 
evidence, and bring suit. At the end of the four years, her claim expires. 
However, if the defendant misleads the plaintiff to believe that she does 
not have a claim, fraudulent concealment doctrine tolls the limitations 
period. Thus, if the defendant conceals any element of the offense, 
including, but not limited to, the injury itself, the four-year period 
will be 
tolled. For this reason, an injury discovery rule that includes equitable 
tolling approaches an injury and pattern discovery rule. The primary 
difference is that under an equitable tolling regime, the decision whether 
to toll the limitations period for lack of pattern discovery is left to 
the 
court's discretion. Nonetheless, fraudulent concealment doctrine 
provides an extremely generous "out" from the potentially harsh injury 
discovery rule of Forbes. 
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question in the negative. Therefore, we reject the 
Appellants' fraudulent concealment claim. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment in favor Kidder 
Peabody & Co., Inc. and the Henry S. Miller Organization. 
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